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NOTES
Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes by
Criminal Defendants
INTRODUCTION
The grand jury has performed a vital function in Anglo-American
law for many centuries. An indictment returned by a grand jury has
long been one of the principal modes of accusation in criminal
cases." Traditionally, the proceedings of the grand jury have been
kept secret, insofar as practical, in order to insure to the grand jury
the greatest possible independence and facility in conducting its
investigations.2 The rationale commonly given in support of this
policy is that grand jury secrecy: (1) prevents suspects from covering
up illegal operations or escaping prior to arrest; (2) prevents de-
fendants from fabricating perjured defenses; (3) guards against
defamation of suspects who may never be indicted; (4) allows grand
jurors freedom to express their opinions and to cast their votes with-
out fear of disclosure; (5) protects both grand jurors and witnesses
from being subjected to pressures from suspects and thus elicits more
accurate disclosures.3
Probably there are few authorities who would dispute the need
for secrecy while the grand jury is still in session and before the
accused is arrested. But as one court observed, "The problem arises
as to whether there is a reason for the prolongation of this policy
after the grand jury has been discharged and the defendant is actually
1. Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 137 (1947). In 1933
England abolished the grand jury, with insignificant exceptions. Id. at 140.
2. E.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Goodman v. United
States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939); Latham v. United States, 226 Fed. 420 (5th
Cir. 1915); Atwell v. United States, 162 Fed. 97 (4th Cir. 1908); State v.
Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95 (1879); Jenkins v. State, 35 Fla. 737, 18 So. 182 (1895);
Gitchell v. People, 146 Ill. 175, 33 N.E. 757 (1893); State v. Bowman, 90 Me.
363, 38 Atl. 331 (1897); Low's Case, 4 Me. 439 (1827); Coblentz v. State, 164
Md. 558, 166 Atl. 45 (1933); Hooker v. State, 98 Md. 145, 56 Atl. 390 (1903);
Bennett v. Stockwell, 197 Mich. 50, 163 N.W. 482 (1917); United States v.
Tallmadge, 14 N.M. 293, 91 Pac. 729 (1907); People v. Hulbut, 4 Denio 133
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847); State v. Broughton, 29 N.C. 96 (1846); Gordon v. Com-
monwealth, 92 Pa. 216 (1879) ; Ex parte Gould, 60 Tex. Crim. 442, 132 S.W. 364
(1910); State v. Wetzel, 75 W. Va. 7, 83 S.E. 68 (1914); 1 Holdsworth, History
of English Law 322 (3d ed. 1922); 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2360-63 (3d ed. 1940).
3. See Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 Atl. 45 (1933); State v. Morgan,
67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960); State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186
(1959).
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on trial.", Others have noted that under modern rules of discovery
in criminal cases, defense counsel are able, by indirection, to obtain
the substance of the grand jury testimony by taking depositions
from the witnesses whose names appear on the indictment. Yet it is
not considered inconsistent with the witnesses' oaths of secrecy to
permit defense counsel to take such depositions. 5 Further, since the
public prosecutor may use the grand jury minutes in the preparation
of his case, would not fundamental concepts of fair play dictate that
these same minutes be made available to the defendant in the prepara-
tion of his defense or in search for material to use in impeaching
prosecution witnesses? Many of these considerations have troubled
the courts in recent years when passing upon defendants' motions to
inspect grand jury minutes, and it is the purpose of this note to
explore and define those situations in which the traditional rule of
total secrecy has given way to a particularized need of a criminal
defendant to have the grand jury minutes made available to him.6
I. STATUTORY MODIFICATION
Most of the states and the federal government have set forth re-
quirements relating to grand jury secrecy in their statutes and have
carved out limited exceptions to the traditional total-secrecy rule.
A. Limitations on Grand Jurors and Court Officers
Generally, an officer of the court or a grand juror may not disclose
information concerning an indictment (or presentment) unless the
defendant has been put in custody or is under recognizance. This
prohibition does not apply to one who has to disclose such information
in the discharge of his official duty or in response to a court order.7
4. State v. Morgan, supra at 290, 354 P.2d at 1004.
5. Ex parte Welborn 237 Mo. 297, 141 S.W. 31 (1911).
6. The more modern view is aptly stated by the court in State v. Faux, 9
Utah 2d 350, 353, 345 P.2d 186, 187-88 (1959):
It will be noted that after the indictment is returned and an accused is
arrested, the reasons for secrecy have largely been spent. As the writer
views it, the furnishing of a defendant with a basis for preparation of
perjured testimony has little or no validity. If he will engage in such un-
lawful machinations, the time element is not going to prevent it and other
processes of law must cope with such unlawful conduct. As to an indicted
defendant and the testimony which has been given against him, the only
remaining reason of any importance for preserving secrecy relates to the
protection of the witnesses and the effect disclosure of their testimony prior
to the trial may have on future witnesses before Grand Juries.
7. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e); Ala. Code tit. 30, § 95 (1958); Alaska Comp. Laws
Ann. § 66-8-54 (1949) ; Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 149; Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-928, 43-1026
(1947); Cal. Pen. Code §§ 168, 924 (Deering 1961); Del. Super. Ct. (Crim.)
R. 6(e); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 905.26 (1944); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 279-1 (1955);
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4402 (1948); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 720 (Smith-Hurd
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Nor may an officer of the court or a grand juror disclose any evidence
given before the grand jury, except when lawfully required to testify
as a witness in relation thereto.8 These statutory mandates are
found in a majority of the states and in the federal rules. But they
are, at best, ambiguous, and it has been for the courts to decide when
an officer of the court or a grand juror may be lawfully required to
testify as a witness in relation to the grand jury proceedings.
A great many states have specifically delineated certain situations
in which a court may lawfully require the testimony of a grand juror.
Thus, most statutes provide that a grand juror may be required by
court order to disclose the testimony of any witness examined before
the grand jury for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent
with the testimony given by that witness before the court, or to dis-
close the testimony given before him by any witness upon a charge
against such witness of perjury before the grand jury., But still the
Supp. 1960); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-907 (1956); Iowa Code Ann. § 771.23 (1950);
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62-925 (1949); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 148, § 7 (1954);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 277, § 12 (1956); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.958 (1954); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 628.67 (1947); Miss. Code Ann. § 2444 (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 540.320 (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94.6427 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1414 (1956); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 172.370, 199.390 (1959); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-6-42 (1953); N.Y. Pen. Law § 1782 (Dennis 1940); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 12-12-10 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code § 2939.18 (Baldwin 1958); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
21, § 582 (1958); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 132.420 (1959); Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-48
(1953); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.28.215 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. 255.19
(1957); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-110 (1957).
8. Fed. R. Crin. P. 6(e); Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 107; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-928
(1947) ; Cal. Pen. Code § 924.1 (Deering 1961) ; Del. Super. Ct. (Crim.) R. 6 (e) ;
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 905.27 (Supp. 1960); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 279-1 (1955); Idaho
Code Ann. § 18-4403 (1948); Iowa Code Ann. § 771.23 (1950); Kan. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 62-925 (1949); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15.471 (1951); Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 28.944, 28.944 (1) (1954) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 613.60 (1947) ; Miss. Code Ann.§ 1790 (1942) (but rule applies only within six months after court adjourns);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 540.320 (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94.3554 (1947); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 199.390 (1959); N.Y. Pen. Law § 1783 (Dennis 1940); N.D. Cent.
Code § 12-12-11 (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 583 (1958); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-1611 (1955); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. alt. 314 (1952); Utah Code Ann. § 76-
28-47 (1953). See also Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.28.210 (1961).
9. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 87 (1958); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 66-8-35
(1949) ; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-930 (1947) ; Cal. Pen. Code § 924.2 (Deering 1959) ;
Idaho Code Ann. § 19-1112 (1948); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-817 (1956); Kan. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 62-923 (1949); Ky. Crim. Code § 113 (Carroll 1927); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 767.19 (1954); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 628.65 (1947); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 540.300 (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94.6325 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 172.330 (1959); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-30 (1953); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc.§ 266; N.D. Cent. Code § 29-10-30 (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 342 (1951);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 132.220 (1959); S.D. Code § 34.1226 (Supp. 1960); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-1612 (1955); Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-10 (1953); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 255.21 (1957).
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guidelines may not be completely clear to a court. Since the testimony
of a grand juror as to what a witness said smacks of hearsay, would
it not be more reliable to make the minutes themselves available?
Also, if the statute is construed as authority for using the minutes
themselves for impeachment purposes, or upon a trial for perjury,
at what stage is such a use proper? Before the trial or only after
testimony of the witness whose testimony the defendant seeks to
impeach?
It is these questions and others which will be explored in a later part
of this note. Georgia, for instance, goes a bit further and allows grand
jurors to disclose "everything which occurs in their service whenever
it becomes necessary in any court of record, . . ." but excludes com-
munications among the grand jurors themselves. ° Florida and
Arizona specifically allow testimony of a grand juror for impeachment
purposes and upon a trial for perjury "or when permitted by a court
in the furtherance of justice."'" Other states and the federal govern-
ment place no statutory limit upon the testimony of a grand juror and
simply provide that he is permitted to testify when required by a
court in connection with a judicial proceeding. 12
However, every state, by statute or judicial decision, absolutely
excludes from disclosure the deliberations, votes or communications
among the grand jurors themselves.1 3 This prohibition is lifted only
10. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 59-302, 59-303 (1949).
11. Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 107; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 905.27 (Supp. 1959).
12. Grand jurors are competent witnesses both for the state and for the
defense in any prosecution for perjury. La. Rev. Stat. § 15.471 (1951). A grandjuror is permitted to testify when required by a court in connection with a
judicial proceeding. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e); Del. Super. Ct. (Crim.) R. 6(e);
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 279-1 (1955); Miss. Code Ann. § 1790 (1942); Tex. Pen.
Code Ann. art. 314 (1952).
13. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e); Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 106; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-927
(1947); Cal. Pen. Code § 924.2 (Deering 1959); Del. Super. Ct. (Crim.) R. 6(e);
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 905.24 (1944); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-1112 (1948); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 720 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-816 (1956);
Iowa Code Ann. § 771.23 (1950); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62-924 (1949); Ky.
Crim. Code § 112 (Carrol 1927); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15.471 (1951); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. ch. 148, § 7 (1954) ; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 277, § 13 (1956) ; Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.959 (1954) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 628.64 (1947) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 1790
(1942) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 540.310 (1959) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94.6325 (1947) ;
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1415 (1956); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 172.330 (1959); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 41-5-29 (1953); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 265 (Dennis); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 29-10-29 (1960); Ohio Rev. Codes Ann. § 2939.19 (Baldwin 1958); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, § 341 (1937); S.D. Code § 34.1226 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-1611 (1956); Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 374; Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-10
(1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.28.100 (1956); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 255.20 (1957);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-111 (1957).
No grand juror shall be permitted to state or testify in any court how he or
any other juror voted on any question before them or what opinion was expressed
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/4
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when a grand juror is charged with perjury before his fellow grand
jurors.14
B. Disclosure of the Minutes
In three jurisdictions today a criminal defendant has an absolute
right to inspect the grand jury minutes.15 In Iowa, for instance,
"The clerk of the court must, within two days after demand made,
furnish the defendant or his counsel a copy thereof without charge,
or permit the defendant's counsel, or the clerk of such counsel, to
take a copy."'16 In other jurisdictions, no absolute right to disclosure
of the minutes exists except as to prosecutors. Release to criminal
defendants is hedged about with restrictions and left largely to the
discretion of the court. For instance, in Missouri:
No disclosure shall be made of the deliberations of the Grand
Jury nor of any opinion, statement or vote of any grand juror.
Stenographers' transcripts or clerks' minutes showing testimony
of witnesses appearing before the Grand Jury may be made
available to the Attorney General, prosecuting attorneys, circuit
attorneys and their assistants for use in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer
may disclose matters occurring before the Grand Jury only when
so directed by the court, upon a finding of necessity to meet the
ends of justice, preliminary to or in connection with a judicial
by himself or any other grand juror regarding such question. Ariz. R. Crim. P.
§ 106; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 905.25 (1944); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62-924 (1949);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.959 (1954); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 540.310 (1959); Ohio Rev.
Code § 2939.19 (Baldwin 1958); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.28.100 (1956); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 255.20 (1957); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-111 (1957). The Missouri Supreme
Court speaks for many jurisdictions when it states that although the grand jury
secrecy rules have been,
relaxed at least as to pertinent parts of the evidence of witnesses endorsed
on indictments, taken down by an authorized stenographer, our conclusion
is that it is the intent of our statutes to keep secret the proceedings of the
grand jury concerning which the grand jurors are specifically prohibited
from testifying and that transcripts, notes and minutes cannot be used to
disclose such matters.
State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278, 284 (Mo. 1959).
14. Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 66-8-36 (1949); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-931 (1947);
Cal. Pen. Code § 924.3 (Deering 1959); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-1113 (1948);
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-818 (1956); Iowa Code Ann. § 771.25 (1950); Ky. Crim. Code
§ 114 (Carroll 1927); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 628.66 (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 94.6326 (1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 172.340 (1959); N.M.'Stat. Ann. § 41-5-31
(1953); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 267; N.D. Cent. Code § 29-10-31 (1960); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 343 (1937); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 132.210 (1959); S.D. Code
§ 34.1227 (Supp. 1960); Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-11 (1953).
15. Cal. Pen. Code § 938.1 (Deering 1959); Iowa Code Ann. § 772.4 (1950);
Ky. Crim. Code § 110 (Carroll 1927).
16. Iowa Code Ann. § 772.4 (1950).
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proceeding either civil or criminal or when permitted by the court
upon a particularized showing by the defendant that grounds
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the Grand Jury. Disclosure shall not
be permitted by inspection of transcripts of testimony for pur-
poses of discovery or as a substitute for taking depositions of
witnesses endorsed on an indictment and no inspection of clerk's
minutes shall be permitted. 7
C. Oaths of Witnesses and Grand Jurors
Where there has been a relaxation of the strict rule of secrecy of
grand jury minutes, it has normally come about through interpreta-
tion of a statute which binds a witness to secrecy as to his testimony
before the grand jury "unless lawfully required to testify in relation
thereto."'18 Judicial interpretation of this latter phrase has placed
disclosure of grand jury minutes within the sound discretion of the
trial court.' 9 One group of jurisdictions prescribes an oath for grand
jury witnesses, the secrecy portion of which is very similar to that
required in Arizona:
You will keep your own counsel and that of your fellows and of
the state and will not, except when required or permitted in the
due course of judicial proceedings, disclose the testimony of
any witness examined before you, nor will you disclose anything
which you or any other grand juror may have said, or how you
or any other grand juror may have voted on any matter before
you.' 0
Others follow a pattern similar to that of Florida" or Missouri. 22
17. Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.24. This court rule was formulated in the decision in
State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959). Similar statutory
provisions may be found in Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.946(1) (1954) and Utah Code
Ann. § 77-19-9 (1953).
18. E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 540.110 (1959) (oath of witness).
19. State v. Pierson, 343 Mo. 841, 123 S.W.2d 149 (1938); State v. Lack, 118
Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950) ; State v. Goyet, 119 Vt. 167, 122 A.2d 862 (1956).
20. Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 91. See Cal. Pen. Code § 911 (Deering 1959); Idaho
Code Ann. §§ 19-1011-1012 (1948); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 172.140-.150 (1959);
N.D. Cent. Code § 29-10-14 (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 324-25 (1937);
S.D. Code §§ 34.1210-11 (Supp. 1960) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18-4, 77-18-5 (1953).
21. "[T]he counsel of the State of Florida, your fellows and your own, you
shall keep secret, unless required to disclose the same by some competent court."
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 905.10 (1944). See Ga. Code Ann. § 59-208 (1949); Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 29-1404-1405 (1956); Ohio Rev. Code § 2939.06 (Baldwin 1958); Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 365 (1954); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-101-102 (1957).
22. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 540.080 (1959). See Ala. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 73 (1958);
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 66-8-3 (1949), Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78-6-5 (1953);
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-25 (1958); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-807 (1956); La. Rev. Stat.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss4/4
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A fourth group of jurisdictions prescribes an oath that does not men-
tion a requirement of secrecy at all.2
3
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
With such a complex maze of statutory mandates concerning dis-
closure of grand jury minutes and testimony of witnesses and grand
jurors, it is not surprising that an equally complex mass of ambiguous
judicial decisions has grown up from these statutes, particularly in
view of the fact that the great majority of jurisdictions allows the
trial judge rather broad discretion in granting or denying motions
to inspect made by criminal defendants. It will be noted, however,
that certain patterns begin to emerge upon close scrutiny of the case
law and that when a trial judge grants or denies a motion to inspect,
an appellate court will be loath to upset his decision if it falls within
the pattern observed in that state, even though the language of many
decisions does not always seem to indicate that the patterns have been
recognized or defined. Appellate review of the question normally
arises in one of two ways: (1) normal appeal by a criminal defendant
upon conviction when one of the assignments of error is the refusal
of the trial court to grant inspection of the grand jury minutes for
one purpose or another; and (2) writ of prohibition initiated by
prosecutors in response to the granting of the minutes to a criminal
defendant. The mode of appeal, however, has had no discernable
effect on the tenor of the decisions.
In general, the factors which guide the trial judge in granting or
denying motions to inspect the grand jury testimony are: (1) the
purpose of the request; (2) the crime with which the accused Is
charged; and (3) the stage of the proceedings at which the request
is made. These factors, however, do not operate independently, and
it may often be that the time element will be important only when the
request is made for a given purpose or purposes.
§ 15.204 (1950); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 148, § 2 (1954); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 277, § 5 (1956); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.949 (1954); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 358.07
(1957); Miss. Code Ann. § 1780 (1942); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.3 (1955);
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A-73-3 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 245-46; N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 11-11 (1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 132.060 (1959); R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 9-10-20 (1956); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-1508-1509 (1955); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 12, § 5802 (1958); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.28.050 (1956); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 255.11 (1957).
23, See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-904 (1947) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4518 (1953);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 78, § 18 (Smith-Hurd 1935); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 770.13-.14
(1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 62-905-906 (1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29.225
(1955); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94.6312 (1947); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-5-9-10
(1953); Va. Code Ann. § 19-127 (1950); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5290 (1955).
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A. Inspection for Purpose of Impeachment of Prosecution Witnesses
It is a universally accepted rule of evidence that when a witness has
testified to a material issue in the case, his testimony may be im-
peached by showing that he has previously made statements, whether
under oath or not, which are inconsistent with his present testimony.24
Thus, if a criminal defendant can show that the present testimony of
a prosecution witness is inconsistent with that given by him before the
grand jury, he may be well on the way to acquittal.
The vast majority of jurisdictions grant to a criminal defendant
the right to inspect relevant portions of the grand jury transcript
for impeachment purposes, but limit and restrict the privilege
severely as to the time of the grant and the portion of the minutes
which are to be made available.25 The Florida case of Minton v.
State'-'6 is typical of the majority view on this question. There, in a
prosecution for violation of gambling laws, a denial of defendant's
motion to inspect the grand jury minutes for impeachment purposes
was affirmed on appeal, when the request was made during trial, but
without a preliminary showing by defendant of possible inconsistency.
The court indicated that the accused would be entitled to inspect the
grand jury testimony of a prosecution witness when a proper showing
is made in order to lay the foundation for impeachment of such
witness' direct testimony given at the trial, but that mere surmise
or speculation that a witness' testimony at the trial is inconsistent
with that given before the grand jury will not suffice. Upon a proper
preliminary allegation of inconsistency, the trial judge would make
an in camera inspection of the minutes to search for inconsistencies
and give to defendant those portions which seem inconsistent to the
trial judge. The court apparently predicated its approval of this
screening process by the trial judge upon an earlier Florida decision,
Vann v. State,27 where this procedure was used, following the lead of
24. Missouri Pacific Trans. Co. v. Norwood, 192 Ark. 170, 90 S.W.2d 480
(1936); See Dec. Dig. Witnesses 347.
25. E.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th Cir.
1958); Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894, 902 (5th Cir. 1959); United States
v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 629-30
(3d Cir. 1954); United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 486 (D.C. Del. 1954); Minton
v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959); Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla.
1957); Vann v. State, 85 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1956); People v. Harrison, 317 Ill.
App. 460, 46 N.E.2d 103, aff'd, 384 Ill. 201, 51 N.E.2d 172 (1943) (dictum);
State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957); State v. Harries, 118 Utah
260, 221 P.2d 605 (1950) (overruled and extended by State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d
350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959) which held right of inspection exists both before and
during trial).
26. 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959).
27. 85 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1956).
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many federal courts. The procedure used in the second circuit is
outlined in United States v. H.J.K. Theatre Corp.:
The proper procedure is for the trial judge to read the Grand
Jury minutes to determine whether the witness' trial testimony
is contradictory; if it is, the judge should disclose to defendant
that part of the witness' Grand Jury testimony which contradicts
the witness' trial testimony; and if not, and if the defendant so
requests, the judge should seal the witness' complete Grand Jury
testimony and make it part of the record on appeal.28
However, exactly how the defendant is supposed to make a showing
of possible inconsistency before having access to the grand jury min-
utes is not made clear in these cases, and it would seem that such a
rule might produce a prolonged and jerky trial if the trial judge, on
motion, stops the proceedings after the testimony of each prosecution
witness to search the grand jury minutes for inconsistencies.
The federal courts are in line with the prevailing view, being, per-
haps, even more strict. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
States,9 the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's rejection of the
request of certain defendants in an anti-trust prosecution for a
transcript of the grand jury testimony of the government's chief
prosecuting witness. The request was made during the trial, after
direct examination of the witness, and after he disclosed that he had
testified on the same subject matter before the grand jury. The
court here would require the defendant to show a particularized need
which outweighs the traditional policy of secrecy. The court, how-
ever, pointed out that a trial judge does have discretion to grant
minutes during trial for impeachment purposes if an in camera
inspection is made and the defendant has shown a need for it. The
defendants in this case merely contended that they had an absolute
right to the minutes, since they dealt with the subject matter of the
case and of the testimony of the state's principal witness. Justice
Brennan, in a stinging dissent, joined by three other justices, pointed
out that once the trial is under way, the reasons for secrecy disappear
and the defendants, as a matter of basic fairness, should be allowed
to determine whether or not the grand jury transcript contains in-
consistent statements. The supreme court of New Mexico, in com-
menting on this case said:
It is most difficult to understand how a defendant, who has
never had access to testimony before a grand jury, can show a
particularized need for such testimony, for it can only be after
seeing the same that it can be determined whether there is a
conflict. If the defendant has a right at all to see the grand jury
28. 236 F.2d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1956).
29. 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
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testimony of a witness who is in the process of testifying at the
trial, he should certainly have the right to make his own deter-
mination whether the prior testimony was conflicting or im-
peachable. This, of course, should be limited to the witness'
testimony as to the specific offense, and should not be construed
as granting to the defendant the right to examine all the grandjury testimony, and it is for this reason that the inspection of
the trial judge may become necessary.3 0
Even though a denial of the transcript to a defendant is usually
justified in terms of a particularized need not having been shown,
some other factual limitation is normally present which militates
against the request, usually that the request was made before trial,31
which, as a practical matter, makes it impossible for a defendant to
show a particularized need, since he can not yet know to what the
prosecution witnesses will testify. Yet, many still feel that the
defendant already has enough advantage in a criminal trial without
giving him the grand jury transcript, whether for impeachment
purposes or any other. Learned Hand, in a 1923 case,32 aptly ex-
pressed this philosophy:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not
disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when
there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence
against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense,
fairly or foully, I have never been able to see. No doubt grandjuries err and indictments are calamities to honest men, but we
must work with human beings and we can correct such errors
only at too large a price. Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an
unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism
and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the
prosecution of crime.3-
Thus, beyond the primary limitation that the request must be made
during trial, the "particularized need" test pointed out in the Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass case becomes, in reality, a rule in which philo-
sophical concepts of justice and fair play are balanced against some
30. State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 289, 354 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1960).
31. See United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959); Commonwealth v. Ries, 337 Mass.
565, 150 N.E.2d 527 (1958) ; Hanes v. State, 341 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. 1960) ;
State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605 (1950); State v. Goyet, 119 Vt. 167,
122 A.2d 862 (1956).
32. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
33. Id. at 649.
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long felt need of the judiciary to maintain the secrecy of grand jury
minutes. Even if a court feels that the defendant may have a real
need for the transcript in order to show inconsistent statements of
a state's witness, this does not mean that the whole transcript will
be turned over to him. The minutes are available only as to those
witnesses who have testified at the trial and will not be granted
simply to aid defense counsel in cross-examination of other prosecu-
tion witnesses. 34 Further, where inspection for impeachment is
allowed, defendant is entitled to see only the relevant parts of the
testimony, and the determination of relevancy is normally made by
the trial judge in a screening procedure.3 Finally, unless the testi-
mony sought to be impeached is material to the issues of the case,
a trial judge is justified in denying an inspection of the minutes.30
But the guiding criteria in granting grand jury minutes for im-
peachment purposes are by no means uniform, and there are signs
that the heretofore impregnable barrier to pretrial inspection of the
minutes is softening, due in part, perhaps, to increasingly liberal rules
of discovery. A 1959 Utah decision, State v. Faux,", stands out as
representing a distinct break from the traditional holdings and a
sizable step toward a more liberalized concept of discovery in criminal
cases. This case involved a city commissioner of Salt Lake City who
had been indicted by a grand jury for misconduct in office. Defendant
requested, and obtained, prior to trial, for impeachment purposes,
the transcript of the grand jury witnesses who were listed on the
indictment. The district attorney obtained an alternative writ of
prohibition and, upon seeking an order from the Utah Supreme Court
to make the order permanent, the writ was recalled, the court holding
that defendant was not required to wait until the prosecution wit-
nesses had testified at the trial before obtaining a transcript of their
testimony for impeachment purposes. 8 As in most states, the Utah
statute provides for release of grand jury minutes during trial when
the question of inconsistency arises but is silent as to pre-trial in-
34. State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 579-80, 18 A.2d 895, 914 (1941); Richards
v. State, 144 Fla. 177, 197 So. 772 (1940).
35. United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959); State v. Hayes,
supra note 34 at 579-80, 18 A.2d at 914; Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811
(Fla. 1957); Vann v. State, 85 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1956); People v. Dales, 309
N.Y. 97, 127 N.E.2d 829 (1955); State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605,
614-15 (1950); State v. Ingels, 4 Wash. 2d 676, 104 P.2d 944, 954 (1940).
36. Arnold v. State, 179 Ark. 1066, 20 S.W.2d 189 (1929) (alleged incon-
sistency was immaterial to issues of case in murder prosecution and establish-
ment of contra-fact would not have changed the result); Nisbet v. State, 336
S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim. 1959).
37. 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959).
38. Ibid.
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spection.1 The court recognized that grand jury proceedings have
historically been kept secret and that it was proceeding in opposition
to the decided weight of authority. But, upon the assumption that
old law is not necessarily good law, it overruled its former holding
on this question"° and emphatically established the defendant's right
to pre-trial inspection of grand jury minutes for impeachment pur-
poses. The court outlined the traditional reasons given by most courts
for preserving the secrecy of grand jury minutes,41 such as the pre-
vention of the flight of suspects, prevention of tampering with the
grand jury and the avoidance of fabricated, perjured defenses. But
it was noted, quite logically, that after arrest of the accused, the
reasons for secrecy have largely been spent, and that withholding
grand jury transcripts will not prevent the fabrication of perjured
defenses by unscrupulous defense counsel, since to one who is willing
to engage in such unlawful defense techniques, the time element
will make no difference. The court also quickly pointed out how the
rule in the majority jurisdictions, requiring inspection on motion
of the minutes for possible inconsistencies after the testimony of each
prosecution witness, is a cumbersome proposition:
It should require no elaboration to demonstrate how cumber-
some and difficult it would be to compel counsel to wait until each
witness had testified upon direct examination, then procure the
transcript pursuant to the order authorized by the statute, and
thereafter determine whether impeachment should be pursued. It
is obvious, of course, that the defense cannot know whether the
prior testimony of the witness was inconsistent with the testi-
mony given at the trial unless he knows what the testimony before
the Grand Jury was. It is quite unlikely that a witness would
voluntarily reveal that he had previously testified differently. To
give the defendant the theoretical right to use the transcript to
impeach the witnesses and then make it so difficult to use as to be
ineffectual would be but an empty delusion, unworthy of our
standards of fairness to both sides in such a trial.42
The court also exposed a procedural inequity which seems to have
gone unnoticed by other courts in passing on this question. Where one
is charged by the usual method of filing a complaint, he is entitled
to a preliminary hearing which affords him an opportunity to know
that to which the witnesses against him will testify. But where one
is indicted by a grand jury, he is not afforded a similar privilege.
39. Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-10 (1953).
40. State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605 (1950), where the court held
that the trial judge had committed no error in not furnishing defendant with the
grand jury transcript before trial for impeachment purposes.
41. State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 353, 345 P.2d 186, 187. See text accompany-
ing note 3 supra.
42. Id. at 353-54, 345 P.2d at 188.
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Why should the form of the accusation control the accused's rights
to know the nature of the testimony which is to be used against him?
Even though this court was willing to grant pre-trial inspection for
impeachment purposes, it indicated that the privilege is to be re-
stricted to only those parts of the transcript which are relevant and
in which some material inconsistency in testimony is found.43 Further,
there is no court, including the court in the instant case, which will
permit the release of the deliberations or votes of the grand jurors,
such matters normally being specifically protected by statute.44
B. Inspection for Purposes of Trial Preparation
If it appears to the trial judge that the defendant's request is not
motivated by a search for specific impeaching material, and if the
trial is not one for perjury before the grand jury, the courts are in
almost unanimous agreement that a defendant may not have access
to the grand jury testimony for use in preparing his defense, or as a
substitute for discovery techniques. 45 Further, it apparently makes
no difference whether the request is made before or during trial,40
since the "particularized need" test assumes much greater proportions
in a request of this kind. This specificity requirement has found
particular favor in the federal courts.47 The need which necessitates
inspection must be compelling and specific, not a mere "fishing"
expedition, and the showing of that need must be sound. Yet most
43. Id. at 356, 345 P.2d at 187.
44. See authorities cited note 13 supra.
45. United States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Ill. 1960); United States
v. Rose, 113 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Oley, 21 F. Supp.
281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) (dictum); State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895
(1941); Commonwealth v. Galvin, 323 Mass. 205, 80 N.E.2d 825 (1948); State
v. McDonald, 342 Mo. 998, 119 S.W.2d 286 (1938) ; Conway v. Quinn, 168 S.W.2d
445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942); People v. McOmber, 206 Misc. 465, 133 N.Y.S.2d 407
(1954) ; People v. McCarthy, 188 Misc. 132, 67 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1947) ; In re Martin,
170 Misc. 919, 11 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1939); People v. Mitchell, 140 Misc. 869, 251
N.Y. Supp. 716 (1931); State v. Selby, 126 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ohio Com. P1.
1955) ; State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910); State v. Harries,
118 Utah 260, 221 P.2d 605 (1950); State v. Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 50 N.W.2d
439 (1951); Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1934);
Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N.W. 116 (1905) ; cf. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 956 (1961); 14 Am. Jur.
Criminal Law § 210 (1938).
46. Commonwealth v. Gedziun, 261 Mass. 299, 159 N.E. 51 (1927).
47. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United
States v. Killian, 275 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Wortman, 26
F.R.D. 183 (E.D. Ill. 1960).
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of these same courts have evolved an exception to this doctrine (or
specific statutory authority exists) whereby one accused of perjury
or subornation of perjury allegedly committed before a grand jury
has the right to inspect, in advance of trial, the transcript of testimony
given before the grand jury on which the perjury charge is based,
in order to prepare his defense.48 This is a rule of basic fairness, for
aside from the fact that most persons would not remember their
word-for-word testimony before a grand jury, it is entirely possible
that a given statement might take on a wholly different meaning
when lifted from the context of the full testimony before the grand
jury than when viewed in that context.49 Then, too, the traditional
taboos against lifting the veil of grand jury secrecy are said not to be
violated, since all the defendant desires is a transcript of his own
testimony. 0
One of the leading cases on this question is United States v. Reining-
ton,- in which the defendant was tried and convicted of perjuring
himself before a grand jury for testifying that he had never been a
member of the Communist Party. The trial court refused to permit
defendant to inspect his own grand jury testimony. The second
circuit court of appeals, in reversing the conviction, said:
The court denied the defendant's motion to inspect the minutes
of his own testimony before the grand jury. We think inspection
before trial should have been allowed. As already stated, the
essential issue in perjury is whether the accused's oath truly
spoke his belief; all else is contributory to that issue. In deciding
it the jury was entitled to know, and the accused was entitled to
show, what had gone before the critical question and answer,
48. United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959) (held reversible
error for trial judge to deny motion of defendant charged with perjury before
the grand jury to inspect that part of the transcript which contained the
testimony of the government's principal witness. Apparently the federal rule is
not settled where impeachment is concerned. There is a requirement of a
showing of good cause in non-perjury prosecutions before a trial judge may grant
the grand jury minutes to a defendant for impeachment purposes (Pittsburgh
Plate Glass v. United States, supra note 47), but the minutes are readily avail-
able to a defendant in a perjury prosecution where he seeks to impeach the
government's witnesses.) United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954);
United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951); Gordon v. State, 104
So. 2d 524, 537 (Fla. 1958); State v. Ingels, 4 Wash. 2d 676, 104 P.2d 944
(1940) (defendant given only part of his testimony alleged to be false) ; see State
v. Brinkley, 354 Mo. 337, 189 S.W.2d 314 (1945).
49. In Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 831, 842 (8th Cir. 1943), it was said:
"A charge of perjury may not be sustained by the device of lifting a statement
of the accused out of its immediate context and thus giving it a meaning wholly
different from that which its context clearly shows."
50. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 630 (3d Cir. 1954).
51. 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 907 (1952).
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since this might throw light on how he understood the question
and what he meant by his answer. For example, if he had previ-
ously testified that he never had a Party card, that might indicate
that he believed that without a card he could not be a member.
His memory of what he said is no adequate substitute for the
minutes themselves. It is one thing to deny the defense access
to grand jury minutes which it intends to use for the relatively
negative purpose of impeaching a witness; it is quite a different
thing to deny an accused access to the minutes of his own testi-
mony which may afford him an affirmative defense. 2
Whether one agrees that it is a good policy to grant the grand jury
minutes to one accused of perjury or not, the fact remains that the
courts have not confined themselves in these cases to merely granting
the testimony of the defendant before the grand jury. A recent New
Jersey case, State v. Moffa, 53 involving a prosecution for perjury and
subornation of perjury, evidently ignored the general prohibition
against releasing more testimony than that of the defendant himself,
and granted, before trial, the testimony of the state's principal witness
for impeachment purposes, citing the earlier New Jersey case of
State v. MucCi54 as authority. But the court failed to note that in the
Mucci case the minutes were requested during the actual trial and
after it was disclosed that the state's witnesses had been provided
with their own grand jury testimony before trial for purposes of
refreshing their recollection. The court in Moffa also cited United
States v. Remington55 as authority for the proposition that the federal
courts have decided that testimony of a defendant before a grand jury
is available to him in the preparation of his defense," but it failed
to note that the Remington decision is not concerned with the release
of the minutes for impeachment purposes and expressly limits the
release of grand jury testimony to the relevant segments of the de-
fendant's testimony upon which a charge of perjury is based.
The present position of the federal courts in granting grand jury
transcripts for impeachment purposes during a perjury trial is not
clear. In United States v. Zborowski5 7 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a conviction for perjury allegedly committed before
the grand jury, where the trial judge, during trial, failed to grant
to defendant for impeachment purposes the grand jury testimony of
the state's principal witness. Evidently, defendant's request for a
transcript, without any showing of particularized need or any pre-
liminary showing of possible inconsistency, should have placed the
52. Id. at 250.
53. 64 N.J. Super. 69, 165 A.2d 219 (1960).
54. 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957).
55. 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951).
56. State v. Moffa, 64 N.J. Super. 69, 74, 165 A.2d 219 (1960).
57. 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959).
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trial judge under a duty to inspect the minutes for possible incon-
sistencies, which he refused to do. The court said: "It offends all
sense of fairness to first require a showing of possible inconsistency
preliminary to examination of the minutes by the trial judge."58 This
court did not make it clear whether the transcript should have been
granted because the defendant was on trial for perjury or because
the testimony sought to be impeached was that of the state's prin-
cipal witness. At any rate, there is a substantial doubt that this case
would now represent the federal rule, in view of the Pittsburgh Plate
Glass case discussed earlier.59 It is certain that a federal court
under the Pittsburgh Plate Glass case would require some showing
of particularized need or possible inconsistency, but whether such a
requirement would be eased in a perjury prosecution is an open
question.
C. Pre-Trial Inspection Upon Allegation by Defendant of Insufficient
Evidence to Support the Indictment
It is an almost universal rule that a trial court may refuse to grant
the grand jury transcript to a defendant upon his allegation that the
indictment is based on insufficient evidence. 60 This is due primarily to
the presumption that the grand jury acted on sufficient evidence, and
the only question is whether the grand jury had before it any evidence
at all.6 1 It is difficult to find fault with the majority position on this
issue, since to grant the minutes in such a situation would, in effect,
put the trial judge in the position of passing on the sufficiency of
evidence which he did not hear and would result in trying the ac-
cused before the grand jury. Missouri, on the other hand, makes a
distinction between "insufficient evidence" and "no legal evidence."
In State v. James,62 a motion to inspect the minutes was denied on a
plea of insufficient evidence, but granted on a plea of no legal
evidence, even without a showing of facts substantiating the latter
58. Id. at 666.
59. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
60. United States v. Herzig, 26 F.2d 487, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); Kastel v.
United States, 23 F.2d 156, (2d Cir. 1927); United States v. Foster, 80 F. Supp.
479 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. Oley, 21 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937);
United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976 (W.D.N.Y. 1921); State v. Shawley, 334
Mo. 352, 67 S.W.2d 74, 82 (1933); State v. Grady, 84 Mo. 220, 224 (1884);
State v. Reyes, 209 Ore. 595, 308 P.2d 182 (1957) (defendant not allowed minutes
at end of trial to show insufficient evidence before grand jury to warrant indict-
ment as ground for motion to quash); Broadhurst v. State, 184 Ore. 178, 196
P.2d 407 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949).
61. Ibid.
62. 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959).
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plea. Although the granting of the minutes may be justified where
there is no legal evidence on which to base it, such as where the
testimony was entirely hearsay, it is submitted that the form of the
allegation of the defendant in his motion to inspect should not control.
The position of the court in the James case apparently overules a 1956
Missouri decision, State v. McQueen,3 which required a preliminary
showing of facts substantiating the allegation of no legal evidence
before the minutes could be granted.
The rule in New York appears to be a little more liberal. There,
the grand jury transcript may be granted when it is sought in order
to enable the accused to move to dismiss the indictment'4 But there
exist requirements of good faith and some reasonable ground to
believe that the indictment may be quashed.65 Evidently, all the
defendant need do in moving for inspection of the minutes is to
plead good faith and allege that the indictment is based on insuf-
ficient or incompetent testimony. The court would then examine the
minutes, and, if it determines that such evidence in fact formed the
basis for the indictment, would turn them over to defendant to use
as a basis for a motion to dismiss the indictment.0
D. Inspection of Transcript Where Used by Prosecution to
Refresh Recollection
The courts have generally been willing to grant relevant portions
of the grand jury transcript to the defendant when the prosecution,
either before or during trial, has used it to refresh the recollection
of a state witness or for cross-examination of the defendant." The
rationale is similar to that given when granting minutes to persons
accused of perjury before the grand jury; that is, the selective use
of testimony from the grand jury record is often misleading when
taken out of context. Also, many states have statutes which provide,
in effect, that whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be
inspected by the opposite party, and no question must be put to the
witness concerning a writing until it has been shown to him.08 The
63. 296 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1956).
64. People v. Bareika, 9 App. Div. 2d 1002, 195 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1959).
65. People v. Carver, 173 Misc. 71, 17 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1940).
66. Ibid.
67. People v. Stevenson, 103 Cal. App. 82, 284 Pac. 487 (1930); State v.
Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960); State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136
A.2d 761 (1957); People v. Dales, 309 N.Y. 97, 127 N.E.2d 829 (1955); People
v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306 (1931); People v. Nicoll, 3 App. Div.
2d 64, 158 N.Y.S. 2d 279 (1956).
68. See, e.g., Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 2054 (Deering 1955).
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rule applies with equal force where the grand jury minutes are used
by the prosecutor to impeach his own witness.6 9
The California decision of People v. Stevenson.70 is illustrative of
this policy. There the prosecutor had used the grand jury transcript
in his questioning of various witnesses and had read into evi-
dence excerpts from it. Even though no indictment was returned
against the defendant, the transcript contained evidence received by
the grand jury during its investigation of the charge against him,
which eventually resulted in the filing of the information against the
defendant by the district attorney. In reversing the conviction for the
trial court's failure to grant the transcript to defendant, the court
indicated that:
Both the law and common fairness to the defendant-and the
former should always include the latter-required that the de-
fendant be accorded an opportunity to examine and, if he was
so advised, to make use of the document as to which the state had
examined these witnesses .... Were the rule otherwise it might
easily be possible for the party having such document in his
possession to select, call the witness' attention to and read before
the court or jury portions of the testimony at the former hearing
which seemingly contradicted the testimony of the witness given
in the pending proceeding, without the adverse party having any
opportunity to discover other statements in the transcript which
might explain the apparent discrepancy.71
But this reasoning loses much of its force when the transcript is
not read into evidence nor used at the trial to refresh the recollection
of the witnesses, but is merely given to the prosecution witnesses
before trial to refresh their recollection, as it was in the case in
State v. Mucci.7- This court held that where the state's witnesses were
together in the county prosecutor's office in the courthouse on the
morning of the trial and were provided by the county detective with
a transcript of their testimony given to the grand jury some two
years before and the witnesses severally read and then discussed such
testimony, and the witnesses, with their recollections so refreshed,
thereafter testified, there was prejudicial and reversible error in the
refusal to allow defendant to inspect the testimony given to the grand
jury and to use it in cross-examination of the witnesses. The state
contended that since the witnesses had not refreshed their respective
recollections while on the stand but had testified from their indepen-
dent memories, defendant had no right to the minutes. The state's
69. People v. Kraus, 377 Ill. 539, 37 N.E.2d 182 (1941).
70. 103 Cal. App. 82, 284 Pac. 487 (1930).
71. Id. at 88, 284 Pac. at 490.
72. 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957).
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contention was well supported by case law,73 but no case cited by
counsel involved an out-of-court refreshing of recollection which was
immediately prior to the trial, as was the situation here. On this
basis, the court concluded that furnishing the minutes to the state's
witnesses immediately prior to trial was tantamount to the same use
during the trial, so that the witnesses were not, in reality, testifying
from their own memory but from the grand jury transcript, which
they had, in effect, just memorized. The court did not mention the
traditional policy of grand jury secrecy and did not indicate what
portions of the transcript would be made available to the defendant.
CONCLUSION
Although the traditional policy of grand jury secrecy still holds
sway in the courts, there is an increasingly liberal attitude toward
furnishing criminal defendants with grand jury transcripts. One
may safely predict that in most jurisdictions a defendant will be
granted relevant and material portions of the testimony of state
witnesses for impeachment purposes when the motion is made after
the direct testimony of the witness and when there is some pre-
liminary showing of inconsistency. Criminal defendants are also
certain to be granted their own grand jury testimony when they face
trial on a charge of perjury before the grand jury because of such
testimony. There is, however, no satisfactory answer when a request
for grand jury minutes is made for impeachment purposes during a
trial for perjury committed before the grand jury. The courts are
demonstrably more liberal in granting the minutes when this situa-
tion arises and require less of a prior showing of possible incon-
sistency before the minutes will be released but, as yet, no generalized
rule can be formulated.
This liberalization of disclosure has not yet gone so far that a
defendant may secure the minutes as an aid in preparing his defense,
and it is doubtful whether the courts will ever be prepared to go this
far, particularly in view of the extensive discovery tools available in
almost every state and in the federal courts.
Finally, due to the inherent dangers of taking statements out of
context, a criminal defendant may depend on a limited disclosure of
grand jury minutes when the prosecutor, in impeaching defense
witnesses, reads pertinent parts of the transcript into the record or
uses the transcript as a basis for formulating questions propounded to
his own or to defense witnesses.
73. Lennon v. United States, 20 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1927) ; State v. Kwiatkowski,
83 NJ.L. 650, 85 AtI. 209 (1912); State v. Magers, 36 Ore. 38, 58 Pac. 892
(1899); State v. Pasehall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15 (1935).
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Perhaps the most significant trend emerging in this field is the
dissatisfaction with the rule which restricts disclosure of grand jury
minutes to those cases where the witness whose testimony is sought to
be impeached has already testified and defendant has made some
preliminary showing of inconsistency. It has often been pointed out
quite forcefully that once the defendant has been arrested and the
grand jury discharged, most of the reasons for grand jury secrecy
have disappeared, and that it is manifestly unfair to require a de-
fendant to wait until after the direct testimony of the witness before
granting him impeachment material. Grand jury secrecy is no less
impaired by disclosure of the minutes during trial than it is before
trial, and it is submitted that pre-trial disclosure for impeachment
purposes could be profitably permitted by the courts without disturb-
ing the sanctity of the grand jury and without giving to defendant any
undue advantage not already possessed by the prosecutor.
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